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Regulating Harm: Tensions Between Data
Privacy and Data Transparency
Kaitlyn Filip & Kat Albrecht1
ABSTRACT
In an era of massive digital data growth, data storage and
dissemination has posed complex new problems for privacy regulations
across agencies and institutions on a global scale. Laws about data
privacy vary substantially by country, by state, and by industry. In
formulating these policies, there exists a fundamental tension between
a desire for data privacy and one for data transparency. This tension
becomes particularly acute as new digital tools and access technologies
have made these records more accessible and connectable than ever
before. This tension is borne out in the enactment of law. Three states
– California, Colorado, and Virginia – for example, have enacted
comprehensive consumer data privacy acts, giving individuals the right
to opt out of data collection and/or providing guidelines for what and
how businesses can collect and disseminate consumer information. In
some contexts and jurisdictions, such as these, data privacy seems to
be an uncontroversial imperative. However, in others, the imperative
swings the other direction, protecting public data access.
An especially salient site of analysis for this debate is criminal
records. Criminal records are not just relevant in court, though the issue
of data transparency vs. privacy is particularly acute for court
derivative records; these records also follow individuals outside of
court and create significant obstacles for entry into employment,
education, housing, and other elements of social life. Public criminal
records can substantially impact an individual’s life well beyond the
scope of the criminal proceeding, making a compelling normative case
for keeping them private. While criminal records can be individually
damaging, a closed system of court data also prevents transparent
knowledge of policies and disparities. Private criminal records and
court documents can substantially hinder evaluating systemic issues in
the courts as a whole, making a compelling case for making criminal
record data public. However, once records are public, they are more
difficult to control and therefore consequences of public records are the
1

Kaitlyn Filip is a Law & Humanities Fellow at Northwestern University Pritzker
School of Law and a JD-PhD Student in Communication Studies: Rhetoric and
Public Culture at Northwestern University. Kat Albrecht is an Assistant Professor of
Criminal Justice and Criminology in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at
Georgia State University. She received her PhD and MA in sociology from
Northwestern University. She received her JD from the Northwestern University
Pritzker School of Law.
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ability of the public to use them for individual decision-making, use
them for potentially discriminatory policy making, and to use them for
commercial gain. The relationship between equity issues in the courts
and data privacy is far from simple.
In this article we examine this tension between privacy and
transparency and its consequences in several different contexts, taking
criminal courts as a case study as an institution where the tension is not
unique but heightened. We consider the use of criminal records as
elements of a transparent court process; as tests for obtaining
employment, education, or housing; and finally, the commercialization
of criminal records themselves in a burgeoning terrain of digital
companies providing mugshots and criminal records, connecting our
criminal case study to other industries. We consider each of these three
domains, laying out the universe of data privacy tensions and data
transparency arguments to create a nuanced picture of how data privacy
regulation interacts with public access. We conclude with
recommendations, grounded in knowledge about innovative data
techniques and data ethics, designed to help alleviate the tension
between data privacy and data transparency.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The world’s capacity to store, communicate, and compute
information have been increasing exponentially since the 1980s,
ushering in not just a new digital age, but also a new digital data
reality.2 This new digital data reality consists of collecting, storing, and
sharing huge swaths of data about everything from individual decisions
to system outcomes. Data can be packaged covertly or overtly in both
formal and informal spaces. That is, the consequences of a new digital
data reality are not constrained to obvious online spaces, this new
emphasis on data is everywhere. 3 This new data connectedness, again
spurred by the capacities of data digitization and increased data
gathering capacity, brings with it new opportunities and new problems.
Creators and archivers of data are then left to contend with new
problems, often without sufficient systems to do so. In this article we
analyze one such system, the United States criminal legal system, and
consider the types of problems and potential harms that must be dealt
with.
The court system in the United States creates a huge amount of
data every year. This data has particular legal requirements for data
2

Martin Hilbert & Priscila López, The World’s Technological Capacity to Store,
Communicate, and Compute Information, 332 SCIENCE 60, 60, 64 (2011).
3
Matthew J. Salganik, BIT BY BIT: SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 3
(2019).
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records themselves to be accessible to the general public and the courts
prescribe potential consequences to the individuals described by them. 4
To consider the magnitude of this problem we can think about how
much legal data is being created each year. More than 100 million legal
cases are filed each year in state trial courts alone, and all of those legal
cases have potential to become substantial and complex data records. 5
Each case has a multitude of attendant documents from charges and
initial filings to motions and transcripts produced along the way.
Furthermore, when jurisdictions collect socio-demographic
information about parties or statistics about types of cases or time to
disposition, these cases generate that data as well. The courts must not
merely receive these cases and create data about them via legal
processes, but they must also develop systems and processes for
storing, disseminating, and protecting that data, considerations that can
be difficult and expensive. Furthermore, the courts and legislators are
tasked with developing formalized systems to address these needs,
considering how this data can be stored and who can access it and when
and how. This creates compounding problems as previously
uncollectable, unconnectable, and non-monetizable information
becomes a type of capital in the new data economy.
We therefore find ourselves in the midst of a substantial legal
and social problem. The courts now have to regulate data, both their
own and data from other sources, but they have never had to do so on
this quickly compounding scale. Courts are creating regulations around
not just ‘data’ in its purest form, but also are generating law that affects
the subjects of those data. This adds a human dimension to the data
regulation problem, where courts have to balance legal entitlement to
data access with the well-being of individuals who may be unwilling or
even unknowing subjects of a rich data record. Functionally, this
creates many decisions for courts to make about data access versus data
privacy. In this article we operationalize this as the tension between
data privacy and data transparency.
We begin our analysis by more tangibly defining ‘data’ and
data-related harms. We then turn our attention to the tensions between
data protection and data transparency as defined and codified in U.S.
law. In order to illustrate the nuances of what we argue is a seemingly
unresolvable tension between data privacy and data transparency we
4

See generally Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F. 2d 1143 (9th
Cir. 1983) (holding that the First Amendment right of access required the court to
provide pretrial records as an extension to the actual records themselves from
previous cases that focused explicitly on the public right to view legal proceedings).
5
Quality Judges Initiative, FAQs: Judges in the United States, INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM,
https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/judge_faq.pdf.
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use criminal records as a case study to analyze public criminal records
as court transparency, public criminal records as continued
punishment, and the commercialization of public criminal records. We
then conclude with a broader discussion about how to regulate harm in
the larger universe of data protection v. data transparency.
II.

DATA HARM AND COMMODIFICATION

It is useful to begin with a discussion of how we are thinking
about data harms as to more thoroughly conceptualize the scope of the
argument to follow. Here we apply a broader definition of data harm,
moving away from a commonly-held presumption that data is
necessarily simply a two-dimensional categorization of numbers stored
in flat files. This conceptualization of data is too static and presumes
that the spreadsheet-style data produced by institutions represent an
underlying truth. Instead, we embrace the relational and discursive
nature of data, considering instead that data “…do not have truth-value
in and of themselves, nor can they be seen as straightforward
representations of given phenomena.” 6 Rather, they are fungible
objects defined by their portability and prospective usefulness as
evidence. As such, in the argument to follow we do two things. First,
we consider what the data produced by the courts actually represents.
Second, we center the experiences of individuals that are attached to
data and data observations, with particular emphasis on what happens
after the data record is created and shared. 7
These considerations become more salient when considering
the universe of data stakeholders who may rely on data produced by
courts. Court data does not only exist for the utility of the courts,
instead it is uniquely public and therefore has significant applications
outside the courtroom. For example, when ex-offenders seek
employment, their prospects are affected by whether or not employers
have access to their criminal records. 8 In this way, it is not simply the
record itself that changes future outcomes, but also the relative
accessibility of that record. In this way, data regulation becomes a key
shaper of employment, education, and housing decisions. This universe
of stakeholders expands further upon the revelation that much of court
data is public, therefore any member of the public is theoretically able
to use it for whatever they wish. This may seem hyperbolic, but it must
be considered through the lens of the current digital data reality where
6

Sabina Leonelli, What Counts as Scientific Data? A Relational Framework, 82
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 810, 810 (2015).
7
Tanya Luhrmann, What Counts as Data, EMOTIONS IN THE FIELD: THE
PSYCHOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY OF FIELDWORK EXPERIENCE 212, 213-14
(2010).
8
Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of
Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 349 (2009).
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“a critical element of the transformative power of digital technologies
is their rising capacity to datafy all aspects of life on this planet.” 9
Who actually “owns” data is an open question. As lines between
data volunteering and data surveillance have become societally blurred,
data itself has also become a commodity. 10 Scholars point to this
commodification as a problem of social inequality, drawing parallels to
colonial projects of dispossession where the individual is essentially
resource mined for their data. 11 Importantly, this data colonization
mirrors many systems of oppression and inequality, having
implications for the general well-being of individuals and, in some
cases, the preservation of their human rights.12 Where this leaves us,
then, is in a new data reality where data broadly construed have far
reaching consequences and uses and where virtually everyone has the
potential to become a data stakeholder, sometimes in ways that threaten
the safety or autonomy of others.
III.

TENSIONS BETWEEN DATA PROTECTION AND DATA
TRANSPARENCY

Before we look specifically at our criminal records case study,
we want to consider the theoretical problem at the heart of this paper
first. As we will show, there are a number of harms that can plausibly
spring from complete transparency of criminal records. This may seem
as though there is an impetus toward data privacy undergirding this
work. However, as we will discuss in this section, these records are, in
fact, constitutionally public and what is ultimately at stake is how to do
data transparency in a way that is productive, ethical, and fair.
9

F. Xavier Olleros and Majlinda Zhegu, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL
TRANSFORMATIONS (2016).
10
See Kat Albrecht & Brian Citro, Data Control and Surveillance in the Global TB
Response: A Human Rights Analysis, 2 LAW, TECH. & HUM. 107, 110 (2020)
(discussing how data becomes commodified through systems of data surveillance
that are not truly voluntary, since agreeing to share data is often necessary to
procure medical treatment or maintain liberty concerning tuberculosis treatment).
See also Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2012) (discussing the complex issues of data
consent, voluntarily releasing data, data sales and surveillance and the current
regulatory framework that exists to protect - or not - individuals in the era of digital
data consumption and dissemination).
11
Jim Thatcher, David O’Sullivan &Dillon Mahmoudi, Data Colonialism through
Accumulation by Dispossession: New Metaphors for Daily Data, 34 ENVIRONMENT
AND PLANNING D: SOCIETY AND SPACE 990, 1000 (2016); Nick Couldry and Ulises
A. Mejias, Data Colonialism: Rethinking Big Data’s Relation to the Contemporary
Subject, 20 TELEVISION & NEW MEDIA 336, 336 (2019).
12
See generally Albrecht & Citro, supra note 10 (arguing that data dispossession of
medical health data surrounding tuberculosis via new digital surveillance
technologies specifically endangers human rights to health, privacy, freedom from
discrimination, and the right to liberty and security of person).

120

Issue VIII

Others have written on a vast array of potential issues with mass
publication of court records, particularly in civil courts. 13 These
considerations include, as benefits: reduction of corruption, enhanced
legislative control over the courts, democratization of the law,
prediction of litigation outcomes, enhancement of the information
infrastructure, reduction of lawyer and litigant error, and automation of
document service and file maintenance. 14 Costs considered are
financial cost, privacy, judicial independence, loss of protection of
lawyers’ work product, and flight to private adjudication. 15 For our
purposes, we focus on the benefits of transparency and potential costs
of privacy in particular, in the criminal court setting, because, we argue,
that is where the fundamental action is in terms of ultimately making
regulatory decisions.
In order to understand the broad stakes of data regulation, we
want to walk through the tension at the heart of this paper: the
functionally dichotomous ideological positionings of data privacy and
data transparency. In order to understand that tension, we will describe
each position and their stakes. First, we take data privacy, looking at
what it means, the legal protections and standards available, current
open legal issues, and an analysis of jurisdictional variation. Second,
we do the same for the concept of data transparency. Finally, we take
up the idea of the tension between the positions, navigating the
substantive and financial costs of creating real public access for
theoretically public court documents.
A. Data Privacy
Court records contain personal information. Specifically, they
contain highly personal and sensitive information. In the case of
criminal records, this is information that can often be used to cause
personal reputational harm. 16 The stigma associated with criminal
proceedings can be potentially harmful socially for defendants or
victims. We know that data has been used to discriminate against
certain groups of people in obtaining credit, employment, and

13

See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV.
481 (2009) (exploring the costs and benefits of mass data extraction from electronic
court records, ultimately arguing that the cumulative potential benefits of widely
public records outweigh the cumulative potential costs).
14
Id. at 494-513.
15
Id. at 513-537.
16
LoPucki, supra note 13, at 516. LoPucki discusses the privacy issue in civil
courts as “reputational data” whereby the data that could be released with mass
publication offers complex issues of personal reputation information. This issue is
potentially compounded in criminal cases.
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housing.17 We will explore this concern in more depth throughout this
article.
Courts and legislators are increasingly protecting digital data
privacy particularly against use and misuse by the government. The
Supreme Court of the United States has, for example, limited the
government’s ability to track cell phone data in criminal cases. 18 States
such as California, Colorado, and Virginia have passed laws that
regulate the types of digital data private companies are permitted to
store and sell.19 The California Consumer Privacy Act, for example,
grants California residents the right of notice with respect to what
personal information – information that can be reasonably linked to the
resident or their household – businesses are collecting and what they
are doing with that collection. 20 Although the idea of data privacy
generally is an ongoing issue in the United States legal system whereby
the courts and the legislators are concerned with specifically regulating
the use and distribution of data, these state consumer protection statutes
do provide some insight into ways in which the law can be nimble with
respect to data protection.
The specific issue of privacy in court data has been more
narrow. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure delineate what pieces of
sensitive personally identifying info must be redacted from public
federal court records in civil cases. 21 Beyond this, the Courts offer a set
of privacy policies for redaction. 22 But the broad positioning of the
Courts, for reasons we will discuss in the next section, is not to
intentionally or specifically limit the publication of court documents.
However, as these attempts at limitation illustrate, there exist
reasonable normative concerns that suggest a desire to protect court
data. Affiliation with court processes can be stigmatizing and court
records can contain personal and financial information.
B. Data Transparency
17

Albrecht & Citro, supra note 10, at 108.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment privacy interests from Katz v. United States also applies to cell phone
location records).
19
California Consumer Privacy Act, 2018 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 55 (A.B. 375)
(West 2018); Colorado Privacy Act, 2021 COLO. LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 483 (S.B. 21190) (West 2021); Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, 2021 VA. LEGIS. SERV.
Ch. 36 (S.B. 1392).
20
California Consumer Privacy Act (A.B. 375). The California Consumer Privacy
Act also prohibits businesses from discriminating against consumers for exercising
the rights delineated under the bill.
21
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 (containing the redaction rules).
22
United States Courts, Privacy Policy for Electronic Case Files, U.S. Courts Rules
& Policies (Mar. 2008), https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/judiciarypolicies/privacy-policy-electronic-case-files (last visited Mar. 10, 2022).
18
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Compared to the legal history of how the courts deal with data,
particularly digital data, the legal history of the nature of public records
goes deeper. The Supreme Court held very unambiguously in 1947
that, “A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room [sic]
is public property. If a transcript of the court proceedings had been
published, we suppose none would claim that the judge could punish
the publisher for contempt. . . . There is no special perquisite of the
judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of
democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which
transpire in proceedings before it.”23 Court records are unambiguously
public records and unambiguously publishable. Further, the Supreme
Court held here that defendants are equally able to obtain and publish
court records.24
The Supreme Court has frequently reaffirmed this stance with
respect to the press. In 1980, the Court returned to the 1565 writings of
Sir Thomas Smith to affirm that the definitive feature in criminal cases
is and always has been that they are public – and, furthermore, put in
writing publicly.25 In 1982, the Court held that the testimony of a minor
victim in a sex-offense trial was not a sufficiently compelling
government interest to allow for closure of the courts to the press during
a criminal trial because the sensitive data in question, the minor’s name
in relation to the case, was already a matter of public record. 26 Although
all of these cases pertain to the press, in each, the press’s right of access
is because of their function as an arm of the public. That is, each of
these cases affirms the public nature of criminal proceedings even as
they begin to show some of the risks attendant to public records.
C. Fundamental Tension and Costs Between Protection and
Transparency
As we lay out in this section, the law is an open terrain with
respect to the regulation of court documents. Although the proceedings
and records themselves are definitively public, we can see that there are
certain risks to their publicity: interaction with the courts involves a
great deal of sensitive and potentially stigmatizing information
becoming public.

23

Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
Id.
25
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 566 (1980) (holding that the
right of the press and the public to attend criminal trials was a guaranteed
Constitutional right).
26
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 61011 (1982).
24

Spring 2022

123

Finally, we want to consider the important consideration of
financial cost. Technically, court records are already public and
accessible (at least to a certain date) at courthouses and are managed
by the clerk.27 We consider, however, potential costs to free, permanent
digital public access. Costs to the courts from a full-scale move to
public digital data could be potentially substantial if difficult to
definitively establish.28 However, the bulk of this cost would be a onetime upstart cost that pales in comparison to the current substantial,
ongoing, repetitive costs to the public. 29 Currently, we argue, the courts
pass that cost onto the public on an ongoing basis: either through direct
charge through the clerk’s office or indirect charge using third-party
court document management services. One well-known direct court
document management service is, of course, the Public Access to Court
Electronic Records service (PACER). At the time of this writing,
PACER charges $0.10 per page for documents, search results, reports,
and transcripts or $2.40 per audio file. 30 Beyond PACER, the cost of
and process for obtaining criminal court records is highly variable
across the United States.
Furthermore, unlike the transition to public digital archiving,
the current costs to the public for records are ongoing. The cost of a
record can be expensive, particularly, as discussed, with transcripts
which can be lengthy and entirely lacking in fee caps. It is worth
mentioning that this fee is not a one-time fee that makes that record
public to everyone, even though the work of digitizing the record may
have been done: this fee is a cost per user whereby any time any
individual or organization wishes to obtain that document, they too
have to pay for access. Not only is the cost of records management
being transferred to the public, it is being done on a potentially
repetitive basis: record access could be an ongoing cost for individuals
rather than institutions. As we discuss in the next section, this cost
barrier works to implicitly define who is able to access this public data.
IV.

CASE STUDY: CRIMINAL RECORDS

Courts vary in their preservation of documents – many only keep them up to a
certain date and preservation is not often a driving goal of the courts: documents get
destroyed both incidentally and intentionally.
28
Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 514-15
(2009); See Smithsonian Institution Archives, Digital Preservation Challenges and
Solutions, https://siarchives.si.edu/what-we-do/digital-curation/digital-preservationchallenges-and-solutions (delineating challenges beyond cost).
29
See Id. (arguing that much of the financial cost to the courts would be in “research
design time”).
30
Public Access to Court Electronic Records, Pacer Pricing: How Fees Work,
https://pacer.uscourts.gov/pacer-pricing-how-fees-work (last visited Mar. 10, 2022).
Documents (such as dockets, motions, orders, judgments, or briefs) have a
maximum charge of $3 per document. There is no such cap for search results,
reports, or transcripts.
27
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In order to demonstrate exactly how this seemingly
unresolvable normative tension between data privacy and data
transparency operates in society, we turn to a specific case study of the
function of criminal records. Criminal records are a particularly
appealing record source for this analysis because they are created and
regulated by the courts but are also some of the most broadly accessible
types of court records in large numbers. Though the exact number does
vary from year to year, there are around 10 million arrests each year in
the United States.31 Each arrest is an initial contact with the justice
system that initiates a data record that will follow arrestees through
courts, carceral institutions, and back into society. 32 Research has also
found that these particular records have significant impacts on exoffenders. In particular, scholars find that there exists a “mark of
violence” whereby the public erroneously believes that ex-offenders
with violent criminal records are more likely to commit future crimes. 33
Not only is this perception inconsistent with existing data about
recidivism, it also serves as a cultural rationale for excluding these
individuals from pro-social opportunities that actually lessen
recidivism.34 Confronted with this reality, we consider the origins of
criminal records before looking at three specific contextual examples
that illuminates the transparency vs. privacy debate.
A. Purposes of Criminal Punishment and Applications to
Criminal Records
Because our case study involves questions of punishment and
the extent to which punishment pervades within the criminal legal data
framework, we begin first by briefly examining theories of criminal
punishment and the related use of criminal records. We use here the 5part framework proposed by Cyndi Banks, which considers five
theories of punishment.35 We will consider them in the order proposed
by Banks: deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and

31

See Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of
Justice Programs Statistical Briefing Book, available at
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/ucr.asp?table_in=2 (last visited Mar. 10,
2022) (Explaining that the number of arrests has decreased from a peak of ~14
million arrests per year in 1990, but has remained between 11 and 10 million since
2015).
32
Id.
33
Megan Denver, Justin T. Pickett, and Shawn D. Bushway, The Language of
Stigmatization and the Mark of Violence: Experimental Evidence on the Social
Construction and Use of Criminal Record Stigma, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 664, 671
(2017).
34
Id. at 664, 672.
35
See generally Cyndi Banks, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(5th ed. 2018), 103-20 (describing these five rationales for punishment in detail).
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restorative justice.36 Finally, we consider how these theories of
punishment translate to the criminal records they leave behind. As we
move through these theories of punishment, it becomes clear that
criminal records can be used to harm individual arrestees/defendants
beyond any clear public interest. This will ultimately illustrate a
problem with the way that court record transparency currently does
operate.
1. Deterrence
Deterrence theories purport that future crime is deterred due to
expectations of punishment for criminal conduct. 37 There are three
fundamental assumptions in deterrence theory: 1) That future offenders
will understand the consequences of a criminal action, 2) that future
offenders will internalize those consequences as a threat, and 3) that
future offenders will consciously choose to not commit crime because
of those consequences.38 Further, deterrence is thought to be most
effective when three conditions are maximized. First, criminal
sentences must be sufficiently severe so as to constitute a deterrent
threat.39 Second, there must be sufficient certainty of being caught so
that severe punishment is more likely. 40 Third, there must be sufficient
celerity or swiftness to receive consequences since future consequences
are thought to be less effective at deterring crime. 41 The cumulative
weight of these assumptions renders deterrence theory practically
untenable for most offense types. Theoretically, homicide-types crimes
should be easier to deter given increased sentences and increased
likelihood of punishment, but studies find no deterrent effects even
under threat of the death penalty. 42 While deterrence theory has been
largely discredited by scholars, it continues to be rhetorically popular
in American media and criminal justice. 43
36

Id. We do not use this framework to argue for the exclusion of other rationales
proposed by scholars in other venues. Rather, we use Banks’ framework to organize
some of the most popular rationales and make sense of this substantial terrain in
criminal justice and legal studies.
37
Id. at 109.
38
Kelli Tomlinson, An Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?,
80 FED. PROB. 33 (2016).
39
Elizabeth Mertz, Lawrence M. Friedman & Stewart Macaulay, LAW IN ACTION: A
SOCIO-LEGAL READER 397-398 (2007).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Richard Lempert, The Effect of Executions on Homicides: A New Look in an Old
Light, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 88, 114 (1986); Ruth Peterson & William Bailey,
Felony Murder and Capital Punishment: An Examination of the Deterrence
Question, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 367, 388 (1991).
43
See generally Travis Pratt, Francis Cullen, Kristie Blevins, Leah Daigle &
Tamara Madensen, The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis,
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Applied to public criminal records themselves, deterrence
theories would postulate that the harm caused by having a criminal
record might deter crime. On the surface, this is quite appealing
because it suggests some future-thinking deterrent component in
addition to time served in a penal institution that might magnify the
deterrent effect. Practically speaking, though, it falls prey to the same
unachievable assumptions and unlikely vectors of maximization
(severity, certainty, and celerity) as deterrence theory in the classic
sense. While criminal records have tangible social consequences, the
extent of those consequences may not fully be known to individuals at
the time of the criminal incident. 44 Further, there is no celerity in
record-based consequences because they necessarily come after an
extended judicial process that may include time served in penal
institutions, whereas the rewards from successful criminal activity are
more contemporaneous.45
2. Retribution
Next, we can consider retribution as a rationale for punishment
and its foundations in moral blameworthiness. Essentially, retribution
argues that punishment is just because it is deserved.46 We can trace
theories of retribution back to the moral foundations of law and
contemporary discussions of moral blameworthiness.47 Criminal law
encodes blameworthiness into law via considerations of intent and
action (i.e., mens rea and actus reus). In doing so, they establish a
precedent that “justifiable punishment is premised on and proportional
TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 367 (2017), (conducting
a meta-analysis of 40 scholarly studies of deterrence theory). See also Nicholas
Goldberg, We’re Swinging Back Toward ‘Tough-on-Crime’ Before Progressive
Reforms Have Had a Chance, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2022),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-03-03/progressive-prosecutors-georgegascon-recall (discussing the cyclical nature of criminal justice policy and notes that
despite a recent wave of progressive reforms, there seem to be signs that criminal
justice policy are shifting back toward dominant ‘tough on crime’ paradigms that
more closely follow the tenants of deterrence theory than their
restorative/rehabilitative counterparts).
44
See J.J. Choi, Jung Jin, Diane L. Green, and Michael J. Gilbert, Putting a Human
Face on Crimes: A Qualitative Study on Restorative Justice Processes for Youths,
28 CHILD AND ADOLESCENT SOCIAL WORK JOURNAL 335, 377 (2011), (discussing
empirical findings demonstrating that youthful offenders did not fully understand
the consequences of what seemed like small criminal actions until engaging in
victim mediation, something certainly not under the purview of deterrence theory).
45
Richard B. Freeman, Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes and
What Might We Do About It?, 10 J. OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 25, 25 (1996).
46
See generally, Banks, supra note 33 (examining ethical issues in practice and
theory in the criminal justice system).
47
See generally, Danielle Allen, THE WORLD OF PROMETHEUS (2000), (arguing that
retribution formed a primary motivation and justification behind prosecution in
ancient Athens).
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to moral guilt.”48 Thus, a substantial prison sentence is retribution for
substantially immoral actions.
These ideas continue to feature in contemporary criminal
justice. In a study of vehicular manslaughter, Albrecht and Nadler
found that information cues of moral blameworthiness (via drunk
driving) prompted substantial increase in suggested punishment
without any changes in the level of resultant harm.49 This link between
morality and punishment serves as a sort of rationale for lengthy
criminal sentences.
Using the same retributive orientation, the consequences of
public criminal records may themselves be the just consequences of
criminal action. However, the punishment born by criminal records is
an indeterminate one, since in many cases these records are never
expunged or removed. Indeed, this application of retribution varies
slightly from the neatness of the penal solution, since individuals with
criminal records exist in the same society as those who do not have
criminal records. Furthermore, rather than find that the retributive
capacity of criminal records serves to reduce future crime, research
actually finds that record clearance may actually reduce crime by virtue
of successful social integration. 50 There is then a potential tension
between theories of punishment whereby it can be considered earned
but not necessarily be effective or purposeful.
3. Incapacitation
A third theory of punishment, incapacitation, aims to remove
offenders from society for extended periods of time to protect the
public and reduce future crime. 51 Theoretically, incapacitation aims to
predict future dangerousness and incarcerates only those individuals
for long periods. Scholars have expressed skepticism about the general
utility of incapacitation, believing it would require huge amounts of
48

M. R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 655 (1993).
49
See generally, Kat Albrecht and Janice Nadler, Assigning Punishment: Reader
Responses to Crime News 13 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY (2022),
https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.784428 (creating realistic
news vignettes designed to test how the inclusion of additional information–that
does not affect the extent of harm caused in the incident - changes amounts of
recommended punishment. They find that including moral cues that suggest
elevated blameworthiness corresponds with increases in suggested punishment).
50
See also, Ericka B. Adams, Elsa Y. Chen, and Rosella Chapman, Erasing the
Mark of a Criminal Past: Ex-Offenders’ Expectations and Experiences with Record
Clearance, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 23, 45 (2017), (offering a study that
analyzes data gathered from interviews with past offenders to examine record
clearance efforts and expectations and the reintegration into society).
51
Banks, supra note 33.
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increases to the incarcerated population with little pay-off due to the
inherent impossibilities in predicting future dangerousness.52 Indeed,
attempts to predict future dangerousness have often relied on racism
and genetic predeterminism (genetics) to predict dangerousness,
whether untaken manually or algorithmically. 53
Criminal records themselves can serve to incapacitate exoffenders, even if they are ultimately released from prison. Americans
with criminal records face significant barriers seeking employment,
accessing housing, public assistance, education, family services, and
establishing credit. 54As such, criminal records themselves are drivers
of poverty.55 But unlike incapacitory theory in its most ideal form, such
incapacitation does not serve to protect the public. Rather it is thought
to increase crime due a dearth of legitimate pro-social options for exoffenders.56 That is, as a form of punishment, criminal records do not
serve to incapacitate and can, instead, serve the counter-intended
purpose of increasing factors that contribute to crime.
4. Rehabilitation and Restorative Justice
Finally, we consider the 4th and 5th theories of punishment,
rehabilitation and restorative justice. Rehabilitative theories of justice
examine more than just the offense, also taking into account the
individual who committed the crime, and their background and
circumstances when assigning punishment. 57 Restorative justice takes
these tenants even further by attempting to make society whole,

See Stevens Clarke, Getting’em Out of Circulation: Does Incarceration of
Juvenile Offenders Reduce Crime, 65 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 528, 535
(1975), (exploring whether and to what extent, incarceration prevents criminal acts
which may have occurred but for the imprisonment of the offender).
53
See generally, Renata M. O'Donnell, Challenging Racist Predictive Policing
Algorithms Under the Equal Protection Clause, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 544 (2019),
(discussing how predictive policing algorithms are a violation of the equal
protections clause). See also Erica Beecher-Monas and Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic
Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for Violence?, 69 LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 301 (2006), (discussing in detail the history of
eugenics and contemporaneous use of genetic pre-determinism to predict future
dangerousness).
54
The Sentencing Project, Americans with Criminal Records, POVERTY AND
OPPORTUNITY PROFILE, 1 https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/Americans-with-Criminal-Records-Poverty-andOpportunity-Profile.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2022).
55
Id.
56
Megan Denver, Justin T. Pickett, & Shawn D. Bushway, The Language of
Stigmatization and the Mark of Violence: Experimental Evidence on the Social
Construction and Use of Criminal Record Stigma, 55 Criminology 664, 672-74
(2017).
57
Cyndi Banks, Criminal Justice Ethics: Theory and Practice116 (5th ed. 2018).
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including a restoration of the victim, offender, and community. 58 Both
of these theories of punishment share something not seen in the
previous three, a desire to reintegrate the offender back into the
community. Critics of these approaches express skepticism that the
carceral state is interested in or capable of carrying out rehabilitative or
restorative justice, a position supported by the historical and continuing
functions of the U.S. criminal justice system. 59
It is difficult to ascertain any rehabilitative or restorative
functions of criminal records as they currently stand. While criminal
records could theoretically signal increased need and priority for
certain social services, they instead serve the opposite function.
Instead, criminal records function as a modern day “Scarlet Letter,”
stigmatizing and excluding the 77 million Americans who have them
from social services, employment, education, and opportunities. 60
Rather than being a gateway for social reintegration, they are instead a
temporally indeterminate obstacle. Scholars find that record clearance
directly improves societal reintegration. In their study of criminal
records and employment, Adams, Chen, and Chapman find that,
“[record clearance] gave them opportunities for employment and
helped them once again be productive, ‘‘contributing’’ members of
society.”61 However, even if individuals are able to expunge their
criminal record, a number of obstacles remain including the practice of
leaving unsealed records with only a notation of expungement,
background checks still including the expunged records, failure by
commercialized entities to report expungements, and the universe of
digital data.62
Importantly, restorative justice does not just seek to vindicate
the victim, but also the offender and the community. In this way public
criminal records have perhaps their greatest positive utility. Rather than
solely being a way to describe the individual offender, they can also be
a way of characterizing the criminal justice system itself. Aggregations
of individual criminal records can reveal important information about
58

Id. at 118.
Francis Cullen, Rehabilitation: Beyond Nothing Works, 42 Crime and Just. 299,
314–15 (2013).
60
Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2999,
3005 (2015); Chidi Umez & Rebecca Pirius, Barriers to Work: People with
Criminal Records, National Conference of State Legislatures (Jul. 17, 2018)
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/barriers-to-work-individualswith-criminal-records.aspx.
61
Ericka B. Adams, Elsa Y. Chen, & Rosella Chapman, Erasing the Mark of a
Criminal Past: Ex-Offenders’ Expectations and Experiences with Record
Clearance, 19 Punishment & Society 32, 46 (2017).
62
See generally James B. Jacobs, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD (2015)
(discussing the collateral consequences of criminal records and ways to lessen
discrimination toward rehabilitated ex-offenders).
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system dysfunction, bias, and inequality that happen within the system
that affects individuals and communities. A substantial amount of
research has focused on revealing these inequalities, though they are
often limited by the ability of research teams to obtain sufficiently
nuanced and sizable data. 63 The public nature of criminal records makes
63

See generally John Tyler Clemons, Blind Injustice: The Supreme Court, Implicit
Racial Bias, and the Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, 51 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 689 (2014) (presenting an overview of implicit bias in the courts and
arguing that key decisions of the courts have generated and reified implicit bias and
that courts should focus on limiting discretion and focus on disparate impact rather
than intent); See L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the
Criminal Courtroom, 126 Yale L.J. 862 (2016) (extending theories of overt racism
in Cook County courts with an analysis of how systematic triage - and the
consequence of scarce resource allocation - exacerbate and magnify implicit
racism); See Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference:
Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509
(1994) (criticizing legal doctrines that accept the inevitability of racism in the
justice system and more broadly critiquing the tendency of protective measures to
only consider bias directed individual defendants rather than to consider systems of
racial bias that permeate all elements of US Criminal Justice); See David R. Johnson
& Laurie K. Scheuble, Gender Bias in the Disposition of Juvenile Court Referrals:
The Effects of Time and Location, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 677 (1991) (considering
competing theories of punishment to test how gender discrimination operates in
courts. They find support for the theory that female offenders are treated more
leniently except for repeat offenders who committed serious offenses.), See Lynn
Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: An Emerging Focus for Judicial
Reform, 21 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 237 (1989) (defining gender bias and presenting a history
of gender bias in the courts with the intention of showing how it came to be
manifested in courts. The author advocates for gender bias being a permanent item
of the judicial reform agenda and for the institutionalization of reforms that have
previously been accomplished while still looking toward future decision making),
See John M. MacDonald & Meda Chesney-Lind, Gender Bias and Juvenile Justice
Revisited: A Multiyear Analysis, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 173 (2001) (presenting
an updated analysis of gender bias in courts, focusing on juvenile courts in Hawaii.
Their findings confirm previous literature that girls are shown more leniency via
informal handling in the beginning of the process, but the authors find that this
leniency declines in the dispositional stage), See Brian J. Ostrom & Roger A.
Hanson, Efficiency, Timeliness, and Quality: A New Perspective From Nine State
Criminal Trial Courts, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 7 (1999),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178403-1.pdf (conducting a study of 9 trial court
systems to analyze case processing delays and defendant characteristics. The
authors illustrate the differences between these systems and argue that courts can be
made more efficient via a three-step process of self-diagnosis, communication, and
education); See generally Malcolm M. Feeley, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:
HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979) (arguing that the final
sanctions handed down by lower criminal courts are a lesser punishment than the
lost employment/wages, attorney’s fees, time, and anguish experienced by
defendants during the entirety of the time spent in the court process. Feeley argues
that in this way the court process itself becomes the punishment); See Kat Albrecht,
Maria Hawilo, Thomas Geraghty, and Meredith Rountree, Justice Delayed: The
Complex System of Delays in Criminal Court, LOYOLA L. REV. (2022)
(Demonstrating that felony case processing in Cook County functions in such a way
that case processing delays become an essential supporting structure of the system
itself, arguing that delays contribute to a lock-in system of case processing delay).
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more sense in a restorative justice framework, then, because of their
utility for understanding the injustices within the system itself.
B. Purposes of Criminal Records
Just as there are many purported justifications for criminal
punishment, there are also various rationales or justifications for the
production and the dissemination of criminal record data. While we do
not claim to analyze all of them here, we turn our attention toward three
such justifications that we believe are at the center of the data privacy
vs. data transparency debate. Distilled from the theories of punishment
discussed above, we name and consider the capacity of public criminal
records to be protective tools, punitive tools, and system tools,
ultimately rejecting some of these possibilities as not supported by the
current uses of criminal record data but considering others as potential
goals of data regulation.64
In order to explore these possibilities, we also consider three
contexts that demonstrate different sides of the transparency vs.
protection debate. First, we consider the protective capacity of criminal
records via an analysis of criminal record commercialization of
mugshots. Second, we consider the capacity of criminal records to be
punitive by analyzing their use as a catalyst for continued punishment
and social disadvantage. Third, we consider the use of criminal records
as a form of system tool to gauge court outcomes and increase justice
system transparency. Here, again, we show how data privacy facially
appears to be paramount; however, as we will argue, productive, true
transparency is ultimately the goal.
1. Protective Tools
Both deterrence and incapacitation theory purport to offer some
protective capacity to society. Applying this logic to criminal records,
perhaps the existence of a public criminal record might have protective
capacity as well. That is, if the public and relevant stakeholders are able
to examine criminal records, they may be able to make choices that
keep them safer. While perhaps valid on its face, we must consider who
uses criminal records to make decisions and how data disclosures
themselves relate to public safety.

64

Importantly, not all criminal records are public. Notably, juvenile criminal
records may be sealed, expunged or otherwise made confidential, but these
procedures are not always easy to initiate, and the juvenile ex-offenders may not
ever be notified that they have the ability to do so. Anne Teigen, Automatically
Sealing or Expunging Juvenile Records, 24 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATORS (Jul. 2016), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/automatically-sealing-or-expunging-juvenile-records.aspx.
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Criminal records are public records, but that does not mean that
they are used equally by all members of the general public. They are
not equally accessible by all people. Criminal records checks are
routinely conducted by social service providers, employers and lenders,
but average individuals are substantially less likely to search for
criminal records. Researchers using two large public opinion surveys
found that 15% of Americans searched online for conviction records in
2018.65 These record searches do not give the searchers universal
information about crime and safety, rather it gives them information
about one particular individual. The piecemeal nature of this search
strategy makes it difficult to envision individual criminal records
constituting a scalable strategy for public decision making, even if the
data you’re looking for is both available and accurate.
When data disclosures do exist that are accessible to all
members of the community, the utility of that data may be quite limited.
For example, in their analysis of The Clery Act, which mandates the
disclosure of crime on college campuses, Fisher, Hartman, Cullen and
Turner conclude that the act is largely symbolic reform because it is
unknown whether or not the data disclosure has had any impact on the
actual amount of crime. 66 In this way, the data disclosure is “doing
something” about crime, but may not actually be having the desired
effect of making college campuses safer. 67 What has also been left
largely unstudied is the impact that data disclosures about campus
crime might have on fear, relative to risk-reduction.68 That is, when
considering criminal records and criminal data as protective tools, we
must also consider the risk and rewards calculus about possibly making
people more afraid of something without providing any meaningful
reduction to risk of victimization.
As digital criminal records have become more widely used, so
has a slate of new entrepreneurial activities that commercialize criminal
records. This criminal record industry has continued to grow with
limited regulation, in large part due to new possibilities in the digital
age.69 Scholars find that each year, over 10 million arrests, 4.5 million
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Sarah E. Lageson, Megan Denver, & Justin T. Pickett, Privatizing Criminal
Stigma: Experience, Intergroup Contact, and Public Views About Publicizing Arrest
Records, 21 PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 315, 332 (2019).
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Bonnie S. Fisher, Jennifer L. Hartman, Francis T. Cullen, & Michael G. Turner,
Making Campuses Safer For Students: The Clery Act as a Symbolic Legal Reform,
32 STETSON L. REV. 61, 88.
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Id.
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Bonnie S. Fisher, Crime and Fear on Campus, 539 THE ANNALS OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 85, 101 (1995).
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Megan C. Kurlychek et al., Enduring risk? Old Criminal Records and Predictions
of Future Criminal Involvement, 53 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 64, 80 (2007).
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mugshots, and 14.7 million court proceedings are released online. 70 By
2013, there were over 80 websites that used a combination of records
requests and automated software to scrape mugshots from local law
enforcement websites, hosting them indefinitely and collecting
millions of images in these online repositories. 71 While mugshot
websites initially made money by charging photo removal fees, they
have since transitioned to relying on advertising to turn a profit. 72
Mugshot photos are available to post because criminal records are
public, with many police departments actually posting them on their
websites that can be easily scraped by private companies. 73 Having a
mugshot taken does not mean you were ultimately convicted, meaning
that even falsely accused individuals are susceptible to being included
on mugshot websites.74
Owners of mugshot websites claim to be providing a public
service, but there is little evidence to support such an assertion. 75
Scholars critique the way these websites display information, writing,
“It is difficult to imagine how the public is served by providing a
conduit through which people may ridicule members of society who
have been judged or are awaiting judgment by the criminal justice
system.”76 These websites offer little in terms of public utility, instead
serving as a means of shaming and stigmatizing their subjects. 77 This
is a poignant demonstration of how public criminal records can be coopted under the guise of information dissemination while having no
legitimate protective capacity.
Private company distribution of criminal records is
overwhelmingly not supported by most Americans, with only 12%
indicating that they support allowing private companies to distribute
criminal records.78 This high amount of societal consensus presents an
70

Sarah E. Lageson et al., Digitizing and Disclosing Personal Data: The
Proliferation of State Criminal Records on the Internet, 46 L. AND SOCIAL
INQUIRY 635, 637 (2021).
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70 RUTGERS U. L. R. 557, 566 (2018).
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appealing in-road for regulatory limitations on the commercialization
of criminal records. Indeed, scholars have argued directly for courts to
consider differentiating between public news dissemination and
willingness to remove data for a fee when crafting criminal record
regulations.79 Scholars have also suggested that a better balance needs
to be struck between public access and data protection that more
accurately represents legitimate public interest over commercial
enterprise.80 Clearly, as the current commercialization of criminal
records shows, there is absolutely the potential for widespread
dissemination of criminal records to cause harm to individuals who
have been arrested. However, as we will show, the current nature and
contours of the public-ness of this data means that it can only be used
in this harmful way, negating any aims of productive transparency.
2. Punitive Tools
Taking inspiration from applications of retribution theory,
criminal records can themselves act as a continued form of punishment.
They do so principally by acting as obstacles that prevent ex-offenders
from obtaining social services, employment, education, and housing
via social stigma. As we will discuss in this section, numerous studies
have found that criminal records pose often insurmountable barriers to
finding employment, securing housing, financial security, and
procurement of education among other obstacles.
Importantly, criminal records vary from other forms of
institutional punishment because they are definitionally permanent
unless expunged or cleared. 81 Unlike time served in penal institutions,
79

A. Rostron, The Mugshot Industry: Freedom of Speech, Rights of Publicity, and
the Controversy Sparked by an Unusual New Type of Business, 90 WASH. U. L.
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INQUIRY 635, 661 (2021).
81
For an overview of different empirical studies on the effects of criminal records,
see generally Brett Garland, Eric J. Wodahl, and Julie Mayfield, Prisoner Reentry in
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22 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY REVIEW 90 (2011) (discussing specific consequences
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housing and employment difficulties); Amanda Agan, and Sonja Starr, The Effect of
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impacted employer callback rates, concluding that disclosure of felony convictions
constitutes a barrier to employment); Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Naomi
Sugie, Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and
White Men with Criminal Records, 623 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
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criminal records follow ex-offenders back into society and constitute a
permanent obstacle, functionally preventing true rehabilitation and
societal integration. Research finds that even old criminal records can
substantially interfere with opportunities for ex-offenders. In their
study on how old criminal records affect current employment
prospects, Leasure and Stevens Andersen find that the “proportion of
applicants with old felony records who received an interview invitation
or job offer was approximately 33% lower than their equally qualified
counterparts with no self-disclosed criminal records.”82 This further
illustrates the punitive nature of widely disseminated criminal records,
with no discrete end to that punishment in sight.
This leaves us with two possibilities: that this continued
punishment is unintentional or that it is an intentional consequence of
criminal activity. In the former case, revision to policies that re-cast
criminal records as punitive are highly desirable in tandem with
policies to expunge or seal criminal records. If, however, the continued
punishment of criminal records is intentional, we might then reconsider whether the science of desistance from crime and public safety
actually supports such a conclusion. 83
In short, it does not. Instead, these punitive collateral
consequences have actually been found to increase crime, precisely
because they prevent ex-offenders from securing the types of resources
and opportunities that are required for successful reentry into society. 84
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

195 (2009) (finding from experimental studies
on the measurable effects of criminal records on employment applications that
criminal records substantially affect odds of employment and further finding that
these barriers were elevated for young black men compared to their white
counterparts); Robert Stewart and Christopher Uggen, Criminal Records and
College Admissions: A Modified Experimental Audit, 58 CRIMINOLOGY 156 (2020)
(finding that nearly 72% of colleges require criminal record disclosure); Corinne A.
Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied Access to Public
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The types of collateral consequences experienced by ex-offenders are
also not proportionate with the harm of the criminal incident. 85 The
digitization of even minor criminal records exacerbates these lasting
harms.86 Scholars, policy makers, and activists have urged regulatory
changes to alleviate these stressors, including making it easier to
expunge criminal records and banning the use of criminal records to
make employment and housing decisions. 87
3. System Tools
So far, the rationales we have discussed for public criminal
records seem to suggest that data privacy should unilaterally be
prioritized over data transparency. Here we complicate that assumption
by looking at the potential for court transparency about criminal records
to improve the justice system in the United States and expose its
shortcomings. Taking our cues from theories of restorative justice and
rehabilitation, we suggest that criminal records are more than just
representative of individual criminal incidents; rather they can be
analyzed in the aggregate to understand and audit the justice system.
This gives us valuable information on success outcomes, the
cumulative impact of the carceral state on communities, and details
about the specific functions of the justice system.
We argue that public criminal records have the potential to
constitute a powerful check on the justice system, giving researchers,
policymakers, and the invested public recourse to see how the justice
system works and whether or not it is fair. Criminal record data is
already public and has already been harnessed by third party profiteers
and other types of decision-makers to the severe disadvantage of people
who have been arrested and/or convicted. The current system of data
storage, then, does not serve to keep data private, rather it only limits
the ability of researchers, policy makers, and the general public to study
Construction and Use of Criminal Record Stigma, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 664, 664, 672
(2017) (discussing the effects and stigmatization of people with a past criminal
record and the new policy initiatives attempting to curtain these effects on
reintegration and further recidivism due to this labeling).
85
See also Stephen Nathanson, AN EYE FOR AN EYE: THE IMMORALITY OF
PUNISHING BY DEATH 74–75 (2001) (indicating that most crimes do not have an
analogous behavior that would be obviously proportionate when it comes to
punishment).
86
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interviews and fieldwork with people attempting to expunge and legally seal their
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patterns within the justice system at scale. This functionally shields the
courts from liability without offering any meaningful increases in data
protection. Specifically, we argue that data regulation around criminal
records should recognize that the current fee structure of criminal
record procurement, where individuals attempting to procure records
must pay exorbitant fees to do so, is not a data protection solution,
rather it is an access to justice problem. 88
That is, the current system works in an ambivalent space with
respect to data privacy and transparency whereby harms are both
hidden and displaced. The current criminal records landscape is, as we
have shown, neither private nor public. It operates in this liminal space
in such a way to ensure that only certain types of information – that
which can harm people who have been arrested – are readily available
and that those which allow for a full auditing of the system that allows
for the perpetuation of those harms is largely invisible. This is the
current landscape in light of an absence of explicit policy regulating the
publication and distribution of these records.
Taken in sum, the examples we describe here articulate where
we see potential to resolve the seemingly unresolvable tension between
data privacy and data transparency concerning court records. We find
that there are considerable problems with the assertion that criminal
records are useful protective tools for the general public, since the
general public does not have access to criminal records to make
decisions and because data disclosure alone does not guarantee
increases in public safety. We also find that criminal records are
currently being substantially used as a punitive tool rather than a
rehabilitative one. That is, having a known criminal record erects
considerable barriers to societal re-entry and desistance from crime.
We do however, see positive potential in the use of criminal records to
operate as system tools to audit and understand the functioning of the
justice system and make courts more transparent. Therefore, we
recommend that data regulation be tailored to both system transparency
and individually-protective goals.
C. Should Criminal Records be Public?
We offer here three potential solutions to the tensions between
the harms and benefits of public criminal records that we believe have
See also Stephen Gossett, Legal Research — We Just Need the Data, BUILT IN
(Mar. 22, 2021), https://builtin.com/machine-learning/scales-judicial-analytics (last
visited, Mar. 10, 2022) (providing an update on the research team at SCALES and
their project to apply machine learning to court-record data that would provide
researchers with access to the necessary data to assess the systemic patterns,
inconsistencies and biases in the justice system, including the waiver of fees).
88
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potential to balance the public interest in ensuring a transparent and
unbiased justice system with personal protection from discrimination
and stigma for individuals with criminal records. Individual harm due
to public records could be lessened in three ways. First, processes for
expunging criminal records can be elucidated and expanded, giving
more individuals protections from individual harms and discrimination.
Second, the use of criminal records to make certain types of decisions
can be limited so as to prevent criminal records themselves from
becoming a driver of recidivism and social disadvantage. Finally,
criminal records can be redacted of identifiable information, but still
remain public. This would make commercialization and monetization
of criminal records less attractive, since they would not be uniquely
identifiable.
All of these recommendations functionally shift the idea of
what the actual data point is. Instead of considering an arrest, charge,
or conviction as attached to a specific individual, we advocate for the
consideration of these moments in the criminal legal process as a part
of the system or process. We argue for data to be collected, maintained,
and distributed in such a way as to protect the rights of individuals but
to still allow for the consideration of the impact of the system on these
individuals. That is, rather than thinking of criminal records as a file
that attaches to an individual noting charge and outcome on the
individual level, courts and legislatures should be thinking of them as
vehicles for extracting key information: socio-demographic
information, charge, outcome, attendant motions, and time to
disposition of case so that the public is able to see trends and patterns.
This treatment of data is not without precedent. Even in data forms, like
the US Census, that seek specifically to quantify and provide detailed
information about the US population, data swapping and differential
privacy strategies have been applied to protect individual
confidentiality without damaging the utility of the data. 89
We want to stress that data regulations can also serve to protect
the public good by taking a systems approach to transparency and
guarding against inequality. Criminal record data and court process
data remains one of our best ways of understanding processes and
outcomes in the criminal justice system. Protective motivations should
not preclude the use of this data to audit the justice system. For the most
89

The U.S. Census has managed and continued to update data swapping and
blinding procedures (with no known compromises to confidentiality as of this
writing). Notably, the Census has also provided quantifications of how their data
protection procedures affect results so as to maximize the flexibility and utility of
the data for researchers and policymakers. See National Conference of State
Legislatures, Differential Privacy for Census Data,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/differential-privacy-for-census-dataexplained.aspx (last accessed Mar. 10, 2022).
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part, criminal record data is already public, it just is not accessible to
researchers, policy makers, and the public who want to understand the
workings of the justice system. Making data ethically available
(including utilizing redactions or data blinding) serves the project of
equalizing access to what is already entitled to the public. The U.S.
government needs to support this project of record accessibility
financially and logistically in order to ensure that these constitutional
rights to access continue to be protected.
V.

CONCLUSION: REGULATING THE LARGER UNIVERSE OF
DATA PROTECTION VS. TRANSPARENCY

In this article, we have examined the current unregulated terrain
of data privacy and transparency with respect to criminal records. We
argue that there is a fundamental normative tension between data
privacy and transparency in this arena: privacy and transparency are
competing needs in the courts where data can both serve to cause harm
and to shed light on systemic issues. Ultimately, we argue that these
records are public and should be public, but courts and legislators must
consider the use and distribution of those records with respect to the
public interest. As we have shown, the publication of court data as a
means of furthering retributive or deterrent interests is ineffective at
meeting those ends. Instead, we should focus on ensuring that data is
utilized in a way that allows for furthering interests of justice via court
transparency.

